20 ideas
| 13795 | Properties only have identity in the context of their contraries [Elder] |
| 13798 | Maybe we should give up the statue [Elder] |
| 13797 | The loss of an essential property means the end of an existence [Elder] |
| 13794 | Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages [Elder] |
| 13796 | Essential properties are bound together, and would be lost together [Elder] |
| 8808 | Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee] |
| 8807 | Evidentialism is the view that justification is determined by the quality of the evidence [Feldman/Conee] |
| 8809 | Beliefs should fit evidence, and if you ought to believe it, then you are justified [Feldman/Conee] |
| 8810 | If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge [Feldman/Conee] |
| 8388 | Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley] |
| 8389 | Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley] |
| 8416 | Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley] |
| 8393 | We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley] |
| 8390 | Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley] |
| 8418 | Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley] |
| 8392 | Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley] |
| 8399 | The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley] |
| 8391 | In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley] |
| 8394 | Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley] |
| 8398 | Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley] |